The Reaction of Multifamily Capitalization Rates to Natural Disasters by Donald Bleich
JRER  Vol. 25  No. 2 – 2003
The Reaction of Multifamily
Capitalization Rates to Natural Disasters
Authors Donald Bleich
Abstract This study analyzes the effect of the Northridge Earthquake on
capitalization rates in the multifamily building market in Los
Angeles, California. The results indicate that the Northridge
Earthquake had a negative impact and overall capitalization rates
rose. This negative effect, however, was not uniform over the
entire Los Angeles area. During the ﬁrst year the impact was
correlated with distance to the epicenter and proximity to areas
with high concentrations of damage. This negative effect,
however, proved to be a temporary phenomenon. By the third
year after the earthquake, the negative effects of the earthquake
were not signiﬁcant.
Introduction
On January 17, 1994, an earthquake with a magnitude of 6.8 rocked Los Angeles,
California. Although Los Angeles is known for its seismic activity and earthquakes
are expected, the amount of damage done by this earthquake was unprecedented.
Although nearly identical in magnitude to the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake, the
Northridge1 Earthquake was much more damaging for two reasons: its location
directly beneath the San Fernando Valley, in the city of Los Angeles, and the
quake’s thrust-fault (up-down vs. rolling) slippage, which literally threw many
homes and buildings off their foundations. The Northridge Earthquake caused an
estimated $20 billion worth of damages. In the City of Los Angeles, over 65,000
housing units were destroyed or sustained major damage and over 19,000
apartment units were ordered vacated by the Department of Building and Safety
of the Los Angeles Housing Department.2 The purpose of this study is to examine
the impact of the earthquake on the overall capitalization rates of multifamily
apartment buildings.
This study presents a theoretical framework for analyzing the effects of a natural
disaster, such as an earthquake, on real estate markets. Related research is
discussed, along with the theoretical framework, hypotheses, explanation of the
data and a description of the model. A discussion of the results precedes the
conclusion.
The results indicate that overall capitalization rates rose for multifamily properties
that were closer to the epicenter and were adjacent to areas with the highest134  Bleich
concentrations of damage. However, this negative impact was temporary and
disappeared by the third year following the earthquake.
 Review of Related Research
Murdoch, Singh and Thayer (1993) studied the effect of the 1989 Loma Prieta
(San Francisco) Earthquake on single-family residence prices in the San Francisco
Bay area. The results indicate that the earthquake caused an area wide reduction
in property values of approximately 2%. In addition, individuals considered soil
type and location in a special studies zone (SSZ)3 in their housing purchases,
yielding a measurable declining price gradient.
Brunette (1995) studied the impact of natural disasters on commercial real estate
returns, as measured by the Russell-NCREIF Property Index (RNPI). The three
disasters used in his study were the San Francisco Bay Area Earthquake in October
1989, Hurricane Andrew in August 1992, and the Los Angeles Earthquake in
January 1994. The results were ambiguous because of small sample sizes and the
inﬂuence of overall regional economics. However, it was recommended that real
estate portfolios be diversiﬁed across geographic areas to minimize the risk of a
particular disaster.
Skantz and Strickland (1987) studied the effects of a ﬂood in the Houston, Texas
area in 1979. Data from two years before to two years after the ﬂood, showed no
decline in ﬂooded area home prices immediately after the ﬂood. They explain that
this is consistent with the availability of extremely low-cost ﬂood insurance that
allows homeowners to avoid ﬂood risk at virtually no cost. When the ﬂood
insurance rates increased substantially one year later, there were signiﬁcant price
declines. Their conclusion was that the market reaction was consistent with
rational and efﬁcient markets.
Weaver (1990) surveyed 100 major corporate real estate investors after the Loma
Prieta Earthquake that occurred on October 17, 1989. Of the eighty-seven who
responded, less than half planned to formally reconsider their investment policies
as a result of the earthquake. In addition, only 13% to 18% of the respondents
thought that a cutback in California real estate investments was likely. Weaver
concludes that the market has discounted real estate values in the quake areas
properly and/or the risk had been shifted to others via insurance or both the
investment community and the local California business community simply have
not properly identiﬁed the ‘‘true’’ risk. The ﬁrst two conclusions are consistent
with market efﬁciency.
 Theoretical Framework & Hypotheses
In this study, geographical areas impacted by the Northridge Earthquake are
designated as the ‘‘impact area.’’ It is assumed that these impacted areas will
experience an increase in overall capitalization rates and, therefore, decreases inReaction of Rates to Natural Disasters  135
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Exhibit 1  No Impact
 
property values. Those areas that were not impacted by the earthquake will be
referred to as the ‘‘no-impact area.’’ If it is assumed that there was no impact4 on
the multifamily apartment building market, the Northridge Earthquake would be
a ‘‘non-event.’’ The overall capitalization rates of multifamily apartment buildings
in the impacted areas will remain the same relative to rates in the no-impact areas.
This implication of equal overall capitalization rates is shown in Exhibit 1.
If on the other hand, the Northridge Earthquake was viewed as a negative inﬂuence
on the multifamily apartment building market, an overall capitalization rate
increase would be expected in the impact area relative to comparable apartment
buildings in the no-impact area (see R in Exhibit 2). Following the increase,
however, the relative changes in the overall capitalization rates could not be
predicted without additional analysis. Four hypothetical alternatives are illustrated
in Exhibit 2.136  Bleich
Exhibit 2  Negative Impact
If the impact was expected to be permanent and the initial increase was unbiased
(accurate estimation), there would be no reason to expect subsequent changes in
the overall capitalization rates in the impact area to differ from those in the
comparable no-impact area (alternative 3). However, if the initial increase in
overall capitalization rates were temporary and/or biased due to an overestimation
of the impact of the earthquake, the rates in the impact area will decline relative
to those in the no-impact area. If the impact is temporary, the rates will return to
the level of the rates in the no-impact area (alternative 1) and Exhibit 1 would
hold from then onwards. If the market’s reaction to the earthquake was biased
(overestimated the impact) the rates in the impacted area will decline until they
reach a level that is higher than the no-impact rates (alternative 2) but from that
point on changes in the rates will be the same for both the impacted and no-
impact areas.Reaction of Rates to Natural Disasters  137
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Finally, if the initial rate increase was too small (either as a result of an
underestimation of the impact or if knowledge gained after the earthquake
indicates an additional negative impact), the overall capitalization rates in the
impact area would increase over time relative to the rates in the no-impact area
(alternative 4).
In order to test the impact of the Northridge Earthquake on property values, the
‘‘impact area’’ must be deﬁned. Rather than make assumptions about the shape
and magnitude of the impact, the impact area will be determined by the data. Four
hypotheses concerning the impact area are tested. They are:
H 1: Northridge Only
The simplest reaction the market may take is to focus on the name of the
earthquake. If the market places a stigma on the Northridge area only because of
the name of the earthquake, only a negative impact for apartment buildings in the
Northridge area would be expected. All other apartment buildings in Los Angeles
County, including the neighboring community of Reseda,5 should experience no
impact. The impact area is deﬁned as apartment buildings with a Northridge
mailing address.
H 2: San Fernando Valley Only
Northridge is located in the San Fernando Valley. The San Fernando Valley has
gained an identity of its own and is often distinguished from the rest of Los
Angeles. At the present time there is a movement to have the San Fernando Valley
secede from Los Angeles and form its own separate and distinct city. The second
hypothesis tests whether the market will associate the whole San Fernando Valley
with high earthquake risk. Based on this assumption, the impact area will be
deﬁned as all apartment buildings located in the San Fernando Valley area.
Apartment building values in the San Fernando Valley will be compared to
comparable apartment buildings outside the San Fernando Valley.
H 3: Distance to Epicenter
Perhaps the market will discount apartment building values based on their distance
from the epicenter. An additional variable that measures the distance from the
epicenter will be included in the regression analysis and will be tested for
signiﬁcance.
H 4: Quantity of Damage in Area
Although the epicenter was in the Reseda-Northridge area of the San Fernando
Valley, damage was spread throughout Los Angeles. Due to the layout of the138  Bleich
earthquake faults and the types of soil, some areas far from the epicenter incurred
more damage than areas close to the epicenter. The City of Los Angeles identiﬁed
the seventeen hardest hit neighborhoods (comprising eighteen census tracts) and
dubbed them ‘‘Ghost Towns.’’ As of December, 1994, there were a total of 1,030
apartment buildings in the Ghost Towns. Of these, twenty-nine were demolished
and 301 were totally vacant. In addition to the immediate impact of the earthquake,
the Ghost Towns attracted vandals and drug dealers whose trespassing activities
caused additional damage. Surrounding residential neighborhoods were also
affected by the Ghost Towns. Burglaries increased and retail businesses lost much
of their customer base. To alleviate these effects, police and ﬁre department
personnel were pulled from their normal duties to monitor these areas and the city
placed top priority on rebuilding the Ghost Towns.
The last test will examine whether the market distinguished based on the amount
of damage that occurred in the apartment building area. The following variable
will be used:
GHOST  Is the building located in the same map grid as a Ghost Town.
(1  yes, 0  no)
 Data
The data used in this study consists of 2,9406 apartment building sales in Los
Angeles County that sold between January 17, 1993 and January 16, 1997.
Therefore, the data consists of sales that occurred from one year before to three
years after the Northridge Earthquake.
Exhibit 3 lists the average overall capitalization rates for fourteen areas in Los
Angeles County over the four-year sample period. The ﬁrst eight areas listed are
unincorporated areas that are part of the City of Los Angeles. The last six areas
are cities that are located within the boundaries of the City of Los Angeles but
have their own government agencies, regulations and services. There is also a
large disparity between their rent control laws and the laws of the City of Los
Angeles.
The majority of the data were extracted from COMPS, Inc. Additional variables,
including geographic location variables, were hand-coded and added to the data.
An initial list of the variables is shown in Exhibit 4. Only those properties
containing at least six units were used. Properties that were rehabs,7 had
nonconforming uses,8 were legally condominiums, were more than 35% vacant at
the time of sale or sold under conditions that violated the criteria for a market
value transaction were excluded from the data set.
 Description of Model
In order to determine the effect of the Northridge Earthquake on the overall
capitalization rates of apartment buildings, the following general model was used:Reaction of Rates to Natural Disasters  139
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Exhibit 3  Mean Overall Capitalization Rates by Area by Year
Before After
Year N 1 1 2 3
Panel A: Unincorporated Areas, City of Los Angeles
Northridge 17 10.04 13.06 11.20 10.14
Canoga Park 62 11.52 11.39 11.27 10.93
Reseda 17 10.14 10.69 10.70 10.92
Panorama City 58 12.41 12.60 12.14 12.33
North Hollywood 259 9.99 10.95 11.22 11.07
Studio City 36 8.21 8.54 7.37 8.50
Sherman Oaks 47 8.50 9.92 8.06 8.85
Van Nuys 298 10.71 11.15 11.37 11.07
Panel B: Cities Located Within the Boundaries of the City of Los Angeles
Glendale 184 8.22 8.13 8.46 8.83
Burbank 76 8.05 8.29 7.97 8.50
Beverly Hills 38 6.84 7.26 6.75 6.84
West Hollywood 58 8.68 8.76 7.97 8.36
Santa Monica 94 6.74 7.34 6.49 6.85
Inglewood 149 10.11 11.42 12.56 12.41
Cap  ƒ(T, P , L , A , C , Q), (1) i i ij ij ij ij i
where:
Capi  Overall capitalization rate for the ith apartment building;
Ti  Time variable indicating date of sale;
Pij  A set of j property characteristics for the ith apartment building;
Lij  A set of j location variables for the ith apartment building; and
Qi  A set of variables corresponding to the four impact area hypotheses.
The actual variables used in the analysis are shown in Exhibit 4. The variables
are classiﬁed into ﬁve categories. The ﬁrst category consists of a time variable
that was used to allocate the sale to the appropriate year. The last category,
earthquake variables, corresponds to the four hypotheses described above.
The location category includes six city variables. These six cities are located
within the boundaries of the City of Los Angeles. However, due to differences in140  Bleich
Exhibit 4  List of Variables
Dependent Variable
CAP  Overall capitalization rate (net operating income/sales price)
Time Variable
SDATE  Sale date: month/day/year (Used to allocate sale to appropriate year)
Sales Information
DOWNPCT  Downpayment as a percentage of total price
Property Characteristics
SFB  Building size (square feet)
ACRES  Size of land (acres)
UNIT  Number of units
YB  Year built
YB60  Was the property built during the 1960s (1960–1969)?
YB70  Was the property built during the 1970s (1970–1979)?
AGE  Age
DFMNPCT  Deferred maintenance as percentage of total price
VACPCT  Percentage of units that were vacant at the time of sale
ZONING  Zoning
Location Variables
BEVHILLS  Is the property located in Beverly Hills? (1  yes, 0  no)
BURBANK  Is the property located in Burbank? (1  yes, 0  no)
GLENDALE  Is the property located in Glendale? (1  yes, 0  no)
STMON  Is the property located in Santa Monica? (1  yes, 0  no)
WESTHOLL  Is the property located in West Hollywood? (1  yes, 0  no)
INGLEWD  Is the property located in Inglewood? (1  yes, 0  no)
Earthquake Variables
NORTHRIDGE  Is the property located in Northridge? (1  yes, 0  no)
MITOEPI  Distance to epicenter (measured in miles)
GHOST  Located in same map grid as a ghost town (1  yes, 0  no)
SFV  Located in the San Fernando Valley (1  yes, 0  no)
government services, zoning regulations, schools and rent control laws, their
overall capitalization rates differ from adjacent areas that are governed by the City
of Los Angeles.
 Results
In order to measure the impact of the Northridge Earthquake, the data were divided
into four annual time periods. These time periods correspond to sales that occurred
one year prior to the January 17, 1994 date of the earthquake and each of the
three years following that date. For each year a stepwise linear regression wasReaction of Rates to Natural Disasters  141
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Exhibit 5  Stepwise Regression Coefﬁcients by Year
Before After
Variable 1 1 2 3
Constant 9.038 9.767 9.498 9.844
(79.54) (42.77) (31.81) (64.17)
Sales Information
DOWNPCT ns 0.008 0.012 ns
(0.96) (2.31)* (3.03) (0.44)
Property Characteristics
AGE ns ns 0.008 0.008
(1.13) (1.91) (1.83)** (2.19)*
YB60 ns ns 0.413 0.433
(1.58) (0.97) (2.27) (2.85)
UNIT 0.022 0.013 0.025 0.009
(8.44) (4.04) (4.66) (3.50)
VACPCT 0.024 0.036 0.012 0.025
(6.26) (8.15) (2.31)* (6.55)
DFMNPCT 0.091 0.122 0.090 0.086
(3.23) (6.23) (4.00) (4.79)
Earthquake Variables
MITOEPI ns 0.018 0.025 ns
(1.33) (1.63)** (1.69)** (0.91)
GHOST ns 1.207 ns ns
(1.69) (2.66) (1.58) (1.59)
SANFERN ns ns ns ns
(1.58) (0.48) (1.54) (1.26)
NORDG ns ns ns ns
(0.18) (0.93) (0.95) (0.98)
City Variables
BEVHILLS 3.048 2.842 3.948 3.710
(4.23) (3.28) (5.61) (6.07)
BURBANK 1.833 1.788 2.697 2.209
(4.04) (3.34) (5.41) (4.86)
GLENDALE 1.562 2.151 1.749 1.824
(5.09) (7.74) (4.53) (6.34)
STMON 2.883 3.056 3.808 3.663
(6.80) (7.64) (7.54) (9.41)
WESTHOLL ns 1.509 2.155 2.491
(1.30) (3.61) (4.00) (3.01)
INGLEWD ns ns 2.268 1.586
(0.15) (0.95) (5.77) (4.75)
R2 0.2983 0.3319 0.3193 0.2839
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000142  Bleich
Exhibit 5  (continued)
Stepwise Regression Coefﬁcients by Year
Notes: t-Statistics appear below coefﬁcients. All variables are signiﬁcant at the 99% level unless
stated otherwise.
Number of apartment building sales: Year 1  667; Year 1  721; Year 2  616; and
Year 3  936.
*Signiﬁcant at the 95% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 90% level.
ns  Not signiﬁcant at the 90% level.
performed. Therefore, each regression represents one of the four years from one
year before to three years after. The results of these four stepwise regressions are
shown in Exhibit 5.
Model Year 1 estimates the overall capitalization rates for apartment buildings
that sold between January 17, 1993 and January 16, 1994. As expected, none of
the earthquake variables are signiﬁcant. Those variables that are signiﬁcant reﬂect
the risk and/or monetary commitment associated with the transaction. Four of the
cities—Beverly Hills, Burbank, Glendale and Santa Monica—had signiﬁcant
negative coefﬁcients. These four cities are considered more desirable than the rest
of Los Angeles County and apartment buildings in these areas tend to experience
lower vacancy rates and sell at lower capitalization rates.
Model Year 1 uses apartment building sales that occurred up to one year after
the earthquake. In addition to the variables that are signiﬁcant in Model Year –1,
two of the four earthquake variables and the percent downpayment variable are
signiﬁcant. As described earlier, during the ﬁrst year after the earthquake, the
Ghost Towns and the surrounding areas were characterized by high crime rates,
including burglary and drug dealing. During the ﬁrst year after the earthquake,
the city placed top priority on rebuilding these ghost towns. The two earthquake
variables selected were ghost and distance to the epicenter.
Model Year 2 was estimated using sales that occurred from one year to two
years after the earthquake. Only one of the earthquake variables was selected. The
variable selected was distance to the epicenter. During the second year, the two
age variables are signiﬁcant. In addition to the perceived frailty of older buildings,
the building codes for apartment buildings have evolved. After each major
earthquake, the building codes were made more stringent reﬂecting newer
construction methods and post-earthquake research that disclosed design ﬂaws that
increased the likelihood of damage during an earthquake. The last major
earthquake prior to the Northridge Earthquake was in 1971. The YB60 variable
indicates that the building was built in the 1960s prior to the building code changes
that occurred after the 1971 earthquake. Research conducted after the NorthridgeReaction of Rates to Natural Disasters  143
JRER  Vol. 25  No. 2 – 2003
Earthquake indicated that buildings built during the 1960s were more susceptible
to earthquakes like the Northridge Earthquake.
Model Year 3 utilized sales that occurred from two to three years after the
earthquake. The signiﬁcant change in this model is the absence of any earthquake
variables. The age and city variables continued to be signiﬁcant.
 Conclusion
This study has examined the effect of an earthquake on apartment buildings’
overall capitalization rates.
The results indicate that the Northridge Earthquake, in Los Angeles, had a negative
impact and overall capitalization rates rose. This negative effect, however, was not
uniform over the entire Los Angeles area and proved to be a temporary
phenomenon. Initially, the greatest increase in the overall capitalization rates was
correlated with distance to the epicenter and close proximity to areas with the
highest levels of damage (Ghost Towns). As the City of Los Angeles helped
mitigate the adverse earthquake effects in the Ghost Towns, this effect was
eliminated. By the third year after the earthquake, the negative effects of the
earthquake were not signiﬁcant. The only lingering effect appears to be the stigma
that remained for older buildings that had architectural styles that proved to be
less resistant to earthquakes and failed to comply with the new updated building
codes.
In applying the lessons of this study to generalizations about the reaction of
apartment building overall capitalization rates to natural disasters, it is important
to distinguish between the characteristics of earthquakes and other natural
disasters. Despite extensive ongoing research, the occurrence and location of an
earthquake remains unpredictable. Recently the State of California has issued
ratings for the propensity of areas to incur earthquake damage. The reliability of
these ratings and the effects they will have on the multifamily apartment building
market remains to be seen. Other natural disasters, such as ﬂoods, are more
predictable and areas that are prone to ﬂooding can be more easily identiﬁed.
From an investment strategy perspective, the occurrence of an earthquake can
create investment opportunities. Care, however, should be taken to conﬁrm that
the increase in overall capitalization rates for any neighborhood is based primarily
on stigma created by the earthquake and not on exposed weaknesses, such as the
building construction or soil type prevalent in that area.
 Endnotes
1 Northridge, located in the San Fernando Valley, is an area in the northern section of the
City of Los Angeles.
2 Los Angeles Housing Department, Rebuilding Communities, January 1995.144  Bleich
3 The Alquist-Priolo SSZ Act, passed originally in 1972, deﬁnes SSZs as areas of elevated
earthquake risk.
4 This can occur if the market totally ignores the earthquake, if the loss in value is already
discounted in the existing prices or if the risks associated with earthquakes have been
passed on to others via earthquake insurance.
5 Research conducted during the year after the earthquake identiﬁed the epicenter as
actually being located just across the border in the community of Reseda. By that time,
however, the earthquake was known as the Northridge Earthquake and there was no effort
to change the name.
6 The original data set consisted of 4,142 sales. Of these, 693 were omitted because they
violated one of the test criteria. Another 502 sales were eliminated due to missing or
incomplete data.
7 A rehab is a building that incurred so much damage that it had to be virtually rebuilt.
At the time of sale these buildings were totally vacant.
8 Those properties that were classiﬁed as having nonconforming uses included properties
with units in multiple single-family residences and/or duplexes or apartment buildings
with units that were altered to increase gross income but violate building and zoning
codes.
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